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Abstract
In this paper we study monomino games. These are two player games, played on
a rectangular board with C columns and R rows. The game pieces are monominoes,
which cover exactly one cell of the board. One by one each player selects a column
of the board, and places a monomino in the lowest uncovered cell. This generates a
payoff for the player. The game ends if all cells are covered by monominoes. The
goal of each player is to place his monominoes in such a way that his total payoff
is maximized. This game is a constant sum game and has Nash equilibria in pure
strategies. We derive the equilibrium play and the payoffs for the players.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we introduce the two-player (parlor) game of monomino. The players play
on a rectangular board or grid, say it has size 3 × 3. The cells on the bottom (first) row
have a value of 1 unit, on the middle (second) row the value is 2, and on the top (third)
row the cells have a value of 3 units. One by one the players play a monomino, which is a
piece that exactly covers a single cell of the board.
This game has the following rules. One by one each player selects a column of the
board, and places his monomino in the lowest uncovered cell. If a player can choose among
multiple columns in the same row, then we assume the player selects the column with
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lowest column number. A monomino in row i on the board generates a payoff of i units to
the player. The game ends if all cells are covered by monominoes. The goal of each player
is to place his monominoes in such a way that it maximizes his payoff.
In this paper we analyze this non-cooperative monomino game for general rectangular
boards. Notice that the game looks like the game of Tetris but then played with monomi-
noes. More general, it resembles a combinatorial game; both have two players, complete
information, and no chance involved. The main difference is that we are interested in
optimizing the payoffs of the players, instead of determining who may win the game. The
latter question is not interesting in this game since the winner may be determined before-
hand. For instance, if the player who plays the last monomino wins, then the winner is
determined as follows. If the number of cells is odd, then the player who makes the first
move wins, and if the number of cells is even, then the player who makes the second move
wins.
In the literature on combinatorial games the focus is on how to win games with dominoes
or other pieces like pentominoes. [6] studies winning moves for the game of pentominoes. [5]
describes a two-player game played on a square board. One by one the players mark a cell
on the board. The first player to form a domino loses; hence the game is named dominono.
The author provides winning strategies. [2] studies in how many ways a chessboard can be
tiled with dominoes. Excellent surveys on combinatorial games are [1, 4].
The literature on non-cooperative games pays attention to parlor games like matching
pennies, rock-paper-scissors, and two-finger Morra (see e.g. [7]). These are zero-sum games,
that is, the gain of one player is the loss of the other player. Also, these games have no
equilibrium in pure strategies.
In this paper we introduce monomino games and study them using non-cooperative
game theory. Our results include the equilibrium play and the payoffs for the players. This
game is a constant sum game and has Nash equilibria in pure strategies. An initial study
on monomino games was reported in the thesis [3].
The outline of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we introduce monomino games. In
section 3 we show what the equilibrium play and the payoffs are, starting from games with
one column to games with an arbitrary number of columns. Section 4 concludes.
2 Monomino Games
A monomino game is played by two players on a rectangular board with C columns and
R rows. We denote such a monomino game by M(C,R). Each of the RC cells is square.
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The game is played with pieces of 1× 1 cell; these pieces are named monominoes.
The players are named player 1 and player 2. Player 1 starts. One by one the players
put a monomino on the board according to the following rules. A monomino is placed in
a cell of the board. If the piece is placed in column i of the board, then this monomino
covers the lowest uncovered cell. If a player can choose among multiple columns in the
same row, then we assume he selects the column with lowest column number. The game
ends if all cells are covered by monominoes; this happens after RC moves.
We use the following notation. Let Ni be the number of monominoes in column i. If
Ni > 0 then in column i the rows 1 to Ni are covered by monominoes. Otherwise, all cells in
the column are uncovered. Now a certain game situation is described by [N1, N2, . . . , NC ].
According to the game rules R ≥ N1 ≥ N2 ≥ . . . ≥ NC ≥ 0. Let action Vi of a player
mean that this player places a monomino in column i at the lowest free row. Let Vit denote
the action chosen at move t. Then game play is denoted by (Vi1Vi3 . . . Vix , Vi2Vi4 . . . Viy),
where the first element denotes the sequence of actions for player 1 and the second element
corresponds to player 2.
Each played monomino generates a value for its player. If a player places a monomino
in row j then this increases the payoff of this player by j units. Each player wants to
maximize his payoff. The payoff to player 1 after the game is over is denoted by P1.
Similarly we define P2 for player 2. We illustrate these notions in the example below.
Example 1. Consider the gameM(2, 3). This game is played on a board with two columns
and three rows. After six moves all six cells on the board are covered and the game is over.
Figure 1 shows a graphical representation of this game as a game in extensive form, or tree
game. At each node of this tree we mention the player that makes a move as well as the
game situation. At the bottom nodes the payoffs (P1, P2) to the players are mentioned.
At the first node, player 1 makes the move. According to the rules of the game she
has only one action, namely V1 (select column 1). In the new game situation [1, 0] player
2 can choose between V1 and V2. And so on. We find the optimal payoffs and actions
by using backwards induction. The optimal actions are indicated by thick colored lines;
red corresponds to player 1 and blue to player 2. There is a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium, also presented in the table below. The equilibrium payoff is (P1, P2) = (5, 7).
The game play in this equilibrium is (V1V1V2, V2V1V2).
subgame [3, 2] [3, 1] [2, 2] [3, 0] [2, 1] [2, 0] [1, 1] [1, 0] [0, 0]
player at move 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1
optimal action V2 V2 V1 V2 V1 V1 V1 V2 V1
3
Figure 1: The game M(2, 3) in extensive form.
Notice that any subgame corresponds to a game situation.
The bimatrix game that corresponds to this game in extensive form is presented below.
The actions of player 1 (row player) correspond to the nontrivial choices in the game
situation [2, 0]. The actions of player 2 (column player) are denoted by a|bc with a the
choice at situation [1, 0], b the choice at situation [2, 1] if the previous situation was [2, 0],
and c the choice at situation [2, 1] if the previous situation was [1, 1].
(V1|V1V1 V1|V1V2 V1|V2V1 V1|V2V2 V2|V1V1 V2|V1V2 V2|V2V1 V2|V2V2
V1 (6, 6) (6, 6) (6, 6) (6, 6) (5, 7)
∗ (6, 6) (5, 7)∗ (6, 6)
V2 (4, 8) (4, 8) (5, 7) (5, 7) (5, 7) (6, 6) (5, 7) (6, 6)
)
The two Nash equilibria are (V1, V2|V1V1) and (V1, V2|V2V1); they are indicated by stars in
the bimatrix. The first Nash equilibrium is the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Given a monomino game M(C,R), the total payoff to the players is fixed, namely
C(1 + 2 + . . .+R) = CR(R+ 1)/2. Any payoff (P1, P2) satisfies P1 + P2 = CR(R+ 1)/2.
Thus, monomino games are constant sum games. This implies in particular that there
exists a Nash equilibrium. Further, if there are multiple Nash equilibria, then the payoff
to a player is the same in all equilibria. This was illustrated in example 1.
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3 Payoffs and Game Play in Equilibrium
In this section we analyse the monomino games. We derive the optimal payoffs and the
game play in equilibrium.
3.1 Games with One Column: M(1, R)
The games M(1, R) are the simplest monomino games to analyse. Since the board has
only one column, any player must play a monomino in this single column. Player 1 starts
and will play the odd rows. Player 2 will play the even rows.
The total payoff to the players equals 1 + 2 + . . . + R = R(R + 1)/2. Let P
(1,R)
a =
R(R + 1)/4 be half the total payoff in the game M(1, R). We can now formulate the
payoffs per player.
Theorem 2. The payoffs to the players in M(1, R) are
(P1, P2) =


(P
(1,R)
a − R4 , P
(1,R)
a + R4 ), R even,
(P
(1,R)
a + R+14 , P
(1,R)
a − R+14 ), R odd.
Proof. First, consider an even number R of rows. Player 2 is the last one to play a
monomino, so his payoff is
2 + 4 + . . .+R = 2
(
1 + 2 + . . .+
R
2
)
=
R(R + 2)
4
= P (1,R)a +
R
4
.
This implies that the payoff to player 1 is P
(1,R)
a −R/4 since the game is constant sum.
Next, consider an odd number R of rows. Player 1 plays the last monomino in row R.
The payoff to player 2 is
2 + 4 + . . .+R− 1 = 2
(
1 + 2 + . . .+
R− 1
2
)
=
R2 − 1
4
= P (1,R)a −
R + 1
4
.
The payoff to player 1 is therefore P
(1,R)
a + (R + 1)/4.
3.2 Games with Two Columns: M(2, R)
In this section we consider the monomino games with two columns. The analysis of this
type of games is much more complex than for games M(1, R) since now we explicitly have
to take into account the choice in which column to put a monomino.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium play and payoffs of the games M(2, R) for R = 1, . . . , 9. The green
monominoes correspond to player 1, the orange ones to player 2.
One by one the players place a monomino on the board. If the game situation is [N1, N2]
then player 1 plays the next monomino if N1+N2 is even. If N1+N2 is odd, then player 2
plays the next monomino. What about the number of available actions for the players? If
N1 = N2 = R then the game is over, so there are no actions available. If 0 ≤ N2 < N1 = R
then the player at move can only play a monomino in column 2. If N1 = N2 < R then the
rules prescribe that the player puts a monomino in column 1. In all other situations the
player can select column 1 or 2.
The total payoff to the players is 2(1+2+ . . .+R) = R(R+1). Let P
(2,R)
a = R(R+1)/2
be half the total payoff in a game M(2, R). Figure 2 shows the equilibrium play and the
payoffs of the games M(2, R) for games with up to nine rows. There is a pattern in the
equilibrium plays of the games, as shown below.
Theorem 3. In the game M(2, R) the equilibrium play is as follows. If R is even and
player 1 played Vi then player 2 also plays Vi. If R is odd, then player 2 plays V2 at his
first move. Thereafter, if player 1 played Vi then player 2 also plays Vi.
The equilibrium payoffs are
(P1, P2) =


(P
(2,R)
a − R2 , P
(2,R)
a + R2 ), R even,
(P
(2,R)
a − R−12 , P
(2,R)
a + R−12 ), R odd.
with P
(2,R)
a = R(R + 1)/2.
Before we can proof this theorem, we need some additional definitions and lemmas.
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Let the vector (p, q) describe the situation in which column 1 has p uncovered cells, and
column 2 has q uncovered cells. Such a vector corresponds to the game situation [N1, N2]
with N1 = R− p, and N2 = R− q. Since 0 ≤ N2 ≤ N1 ≤ R, we have 0 ≤ p ≤ q ≤ R.
Define f(p, q) to be the vector of payoffs for the players 1 and 2 if they start from
situation (p, q) and both play optimal. Let fi(p, q) denote the payoff to player i; thus
f(p, q) = (fi(p, q))i=1,2.
Define g(p, q) to be the situation after optimal play in (p, q). Thus, g(p, q) = (p− 1, q)
or g(p, q) = (p, q − 1), or both if the two plays are optimal.
We solve for f(p, q) and g(p, q) by using induction starting from (p, q) = (0, 0). The
equilibrium play in the game M(2, R) follows from g(R,R) and subsequent situations. The
equilibrium payoffs are f(R,R).
Lemma 4. First, f(0, 0) = (0, 0) and g(0, 0) = (0, 0). For all q ≥ 1, g(0, q) = (0, q − 1)
and
f(0, q) =


(
q
2
(
R− q
2
)
, q
2
(
R− q−2
2
))
, q even,(
q−1
2
(
R− q−1
2
)
, q+1
2
(
R− q−1
2
))
, q odd.
Proof. First, in situation (0, 0) the game is over, so there are no more payoffs for the
players. Hence, f(0, 0) = (0, 0) and g(0, 0) = (0, 0).
Next, g(0, q) is trivial, since the player at move has no choice. We prove f(0, q) with
induction to q. In situation (0, 1) player 2 can only play a monomino in the final available
cell, which results in a payoff of R for him. Hence, f(0, 1) = (0, R). Also,
f(0, 2) = (R−1, 0)+f(g(0, 2)) = (R−1, 0)+f(0, 1) = (R−1, 0)+(0, R) = (R−1, R).
Now assume that the expression for f(0, q) holds for q ≥ 2. We show that it remains true
for q + 1. If q + 1 is even, then player 1 is at move in situation (0, q + 1). By induction,
f(0, q + 1) = (R− q, 0) + f(0, q)
= (R− q, 0) +
(
q − 1
2
(
R−
q − 1
2
)
,
q + 1
2
(
R−
q − 1
2
))
=
(
q + 1
2
(
R−
q + 1
2
)
,
q + 1
2
(
R−
q − 1
2
))
.
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If q + 1 is odd, then player 2 is at move in situation (0, q + 1). Then,
f(0, q + 1) = (0, R− q) + f(0, q)
= (0, R− q) +
(
q
2
(
R−
q
2
)
,
q
2
(
R−
q − 2
2
))
=
(
q
2
(
R−
q
2
)
,
q + 2
2
(
R−
q
2
))
.
This completes the proof.
Lemma 5. For all q ≥ 1, g(1, q) = (0, q), and
f(1, q) =


(
q
2
(
R− q
2
)
, R + q
2
(
R− q−2
2
))
, q even,(
R + q−1
2
(
R− q−1
2
)
, q+1
2
(
R− q−1
2
))
, q odd.
Proof. We use induction to q. In situation (1, 1) player 1 is at move. She plays a monomino
in column 1, which results in an immediate payoff of (R, 0). The new situation is g(1, 1) =
(0, 1), so
f(1, 1) = (R, 0) + f(g(1, 1)) = (R, 0) + (0, R) = (R,R).
In situation (1, 2) player 2 is at move. He can play a monomino in column 1, resulting in
situation (0, 2), or play a monomino in column 2, resulting in situation (1, 1). He wishes
to maximize his total payoff. From
max{R + f2(0, 2), R− 1 + f2(1, 1)} = max{2R, 2R− 1} = 2R
we conclude g(1, 2) = (0, 2) and f(1, 2) = (0, R) + f(g(1, 2)) = (R− 1, 2R).
Now assume the statement holds for q ≥ 2. We show it is also true for q + 1. First, if
q+1 is even, then player 2 is at move in situation (1, q+1). Using lemma 4 and induction,
the maximal payoff for this player is
max{R + f2(0, q + 1), R− q + f2(1, q)}
= max
{
R +
q + 1
2
(
R−
q − 1
2
)
, R− q +
q + 1
2
(
R−
q − 1
2
)}
= R +
q + 1
2
(
R−
q − 1
2
)
.
Therefore, g(1, q+1) = (0, q+1), and f(1, q+1) = (0, R)+ f(0, q+1) follows from lemma
4. The final expression agrees with the case q + 1 even.
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Second, if q + 1 is odd, then player 1 is at move in situation (1, q + 1). Her maximal
payoff is
max{R + f1(0, q + 1), R− q + f1(1, q)}
= max
{
R +
q
2
(
R−
q
2
)
, R− q +
q
2
(
R−
q
2
)}
= R +
q
2
(
R−
q
2
)
.
Also here, g(1, q+1) = (0, q+1), and f(1, q+1) = (R, 0)+ f(0, q+1) follows from lemma
4. This result agrees with the case q + 1 odd.
With these two lemmas we can derive g(p, q) and f(p, q) for general p and q.
Lemma 6. Let 0 < p ≤ q ≤ R. Then
g(p, q) =


(p− 1, q), p = q even,
(p− 1, q) or (p, q − 1), p 6= q, both even,
(p, q − 1), p even, q odd,
(p− 1, q), p odd.
The payoffs are
f(p, q)
=


(
p
2
(
R− p
2
)
+ q
2
(
R− q
2
)
, p
2
(
R− p−2
2
)
+ q
2
(
R− q−2
2
))
, p even, q even,(
p
2
(
R− p
2
)
+ q−1
2
(
R− q−1
2
)
, p
2
(
R− p−2
2
)
+ q+1
2
(
R− q−1
2
))
, p even, q odd,(
p−1
2
(
R− p−1
2
)
+ q
2
(
R− q
2
)
, p+1
2
(
R− p−1
2
)
+ q
2
(
R− q−2
2
))
, p odd, q even,(
p+1
2
R− (p−1)(p+3)
4
+ q−1
2
(
R− q−1
2
)
, p−1
2
(
R− p−3
2
)
+ q+1
2
(
R− q−1
2
))
, p odd, q odd.
Proof. This proof is with induction to p. The cases p = 0 and p = 1 are shown in the
lemmas 4 and 5. Let p ≥ 1 and assume the expressions for g(p, q) and f(p, q) are correct
for p and all q ≥ p. Refer to this as IH1 (induction hypothesis 1). We show that the
statements hold for p+ 1 and all q ≥ p+ 1.
Case 1. First, consider p + 1 even. Let q ≥ p + 1. We use induction to q and start
with the induction basis q = p+ 1. Then the situation is (p+ 1, p+ 1). Player 1 is at play
and will put a monomino in column 1. Hence, g(p+ 1, q) = (p, q). According to IH1,
f(p+ 1, q) = (R− p, 0) + f(p, q)
= (R− p, 0) + (p−1
2
(R− p−1
2
) + q
2
(R− q
2
), p+1
2
(R− p−1
2
) + q
2
(R− q
2
))
=
(
p+1
2
(
R− p+1
2
)
+ q
2
(
R− q
2
)
, p+1
2
(
R− p−1
2
)
+ q
2
(
R− q−2
2
))
.
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These results agree with the case p+ 1 even and q = p+ 1 even.
Now, let q ≥ p+1 and assume the expressions for g(p+1, q) and f(p+1, q) hold. Refer
to this as IH2. We show they also hold for q + 1.
Case 1a. Let q + 1 be even, then player 1 is at move in situation (p + 1, q + 1). She
can play a monomino in column 1 or 2. Her best move is determined by max{R − p +
f1(p, q + 1), R − q + f1(p+ 1, q)}. Using IH1 and IH2, both terms are equal to R(p+ q +
2)/2− (p2 + q2 + 2p+ 2q + 2)/4, so player 1 is indifferent between playing either column.
Therefore, g(p+ 1, q + 1) ∈ {(p, q + 1), (p+ 1, q)}. For the first move, using IH1,
f(p+ 1, q + 1) = (R− p, 0) + f(p, q + 1)
=
(
p+1
2
(
R− p+1
2
)
+ q+1
2
(
R− q+1
2
)
, p+1
2
(
R− p−1
2
)
+ q+1
2
(
R− q−1
2
))
.
For the second move, f(p + 1, q + 1) = (R − q, 0) + f(p + 1, q), which leads to the same
payoffs using IH2. This agrees with the case p+1 even and q+1 even, and concludes case
1a.
Case 1b. Let q+1 be odd, then player 2 is at move in situation (p+1, q+1). He can
put a monomino in column 1 or in column 2. The largest reward is
max{R− p+ f2(p, q + 1), R− q + f2(p+ 1, q)}
=
R(p+ 1)
2
+
q + 2
2
(R−
q
2
)−
p2
4
+ max{−
3
4
,
1
4
},
where we used IH1 and IH2. The maximum is reached via the second term, so g(p+1, q+
1) = (p+ 1, q). Using IH2, the reward is
f(p+ 1, q + 1) = (0, R− q) + f(p+ 1, q)
=
(
p+1
2
(
R− p+1
2
)
+ q
2
(
R− q
2
)
, p+1
2
(
R− p−1
2
)
+ q+2
2
(
R− q
2
))
.
This agrees with the case p+ 1 even and q + 1 odd, and concludes case 1b.
Case 2. Now consider p+ 1 odd. Let q ≥ p+ 1. We use induction to q and start with
the induction basis q = p + 1. Then the situation is (p + 1, p + 1), so player 1 will play a
monomino in column 1. Hence, g(p+ 1, q) = (p, q). According to IH1,
f(p+ 1, q) = (R− p, 0) + f(p, q)
=
(
(p+2)R
2
− p(p+4)
4
+ q−1
2
(
R− q−1
2
)
, p
2
(
R− p−2
2
)
+ q+1
2
(
R− q−1
2
))
.
These results agrees with the case p+ 1 odd and q odd.
Now, let q ≥ p+1 and assume the expressions for g(p+1, q) and f(p+1, q) hold. Refer
to this as IH3. Below we show they also hold for q + 1.
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Case 2a. Let q + 1 be even, then player 2 is at move in situation (p + 1, q + 1). His
largest reward is determined by
max{R− p+ f2(p, q + 1), R− q + f2(p+ 1, q)}
= R + p
2
(R− p−2
2
) + q+1
2
(R− q−1
2
) + max{−p,−q},
where we used IH1 and IH3. Because q ≥ p the maximum is attained in the first term. So
g(p+ 1, q + 1) = (p, q + 1). Using IH1, the reward is
f(p+ 1, q + 1) = (0, R− p) + f(p, q + 1)
=
(
p
2
(
R− p
2
)
+ q+1
2
(
R− q+1
2
)
, p+2
2
(
R− p
2
)
+ q+1
2
(
R− q−1
2
))
.
This agrees with the case p+ 1 odd and q + 1 even, and concludes case 2a.
Case 2b. Finally, consider q + 1 odd. Player 1 is at move in situation (p + 1, q + 1).
Her best move follows from
max{R− p+ f1(p, q + 1), R− q + f1(p+ 1, q)}
= R + p
2
(R− p
2
) + q
2
(R− q
2
) + max{−p,−q},
where we used IH1 and IH3. The maximum is reached in the first term, so g(p+1, q+1) =
(p, q + 1). Using IH3 once again, the rewards are
f(p+ 1, q + 1) = (R− p, 0) + f(p, q + 1)
=
(
(p+2)R
2
− p(p+4)
4
+ q
2
(
R− q
2
)
, p
2
(
R− p−2
2
)
+ q+2
2
(
R− q
2
))
.
This agrees with the case p + 1 odd and q + 1 odd, and concludes case 2b, and the proof
of this lemma.
We are now able to proof theorem 3.
Proof. (Theorem 3) Consider the game M(2, R). First, let R be even. We show that if
player 1 plays Vi, i = 1, 2 then player 2 will also play Vi. Player 1 is at play in situation
(p, q) if p + q is even. That is, p and q are both even, or p and q are both odd. We
distinguish three cases.
First, if p = q even then by lemma 6 g(p, q) = (p − 1, q), so player 1 plays V1. Next,
g(p− 1, q) = (p− 2, q), so also player 2 plays V1.
Second, if p 6= q and both are even then by lemma 6 g(p, q) = (p − 1, q) or (p, q − 1),
so player 1 may play V1 or V2. If she plays V1 then by lemma 6 g(p− 1, q) = (p− 2, q), so
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player 2 also plays V1. If she plays V2 then by lemma 6 g(p, q − 1) = (p, q − 2), so player 2
also plays V2.
Third, we consider p and q both odd. But, since we start with (p, q) = (R,R) and R is
even, this third case cannot occur. The first two cases imply that we always have p and q
even if player 1 is at move, because player 2 mimics the behavior of player 1.
Next, consider R odd. Because g(R,R) = (R − 1, R), player 1 starts with V1. Next,
g(R− 1, R) = (R− 1, R− 1), so player 2 plays V2. Now we have a situation with an even
number of rows, and play continues as in the case with R even.
The rewards are readily obtained from lemma 6. If R is even then
(P1, P2) = f(R,R) = (
R2
2
, R
2
2
+R).
For odd values of R,
(P1, P2) = f(R,R) = (
R2+1
2
, R
2+2R−1
2
).
The result follows from P
(2,R)
a = R(R + 1)/2.
3.3 Games with at least Three Columns
In this section we consider games with more than two columns. Based on the results for
two columns, we conjecture what the equilibrium play and the payoffs are. We believe
these results are true, but were not able to prove it; the games are considerably more
complex than the games M(2, R).
For games with three columns, the optimal play and the payoffs for boards up to seven
rows are shown in figure 3. The red box around the bottom row indicates that both players
put monominoes in this row.
Conjecture 7. In the game M(3, R) the equilibrium play is as follows. If R is even and
player 1 played Vi, then player 2 also plays Vi. If R is odd then the first move is V1.
Thereafter, if player 2 plays V2 on the first row, then player 1 plays V3. Otherwise, if
player 2 plays Vi then player 1 does the same. The equilibrium payoffs are
(P1, P2) =

(P
(3,R)
a − 34R,P
(3,R)
a + 34R), R even,
(P
(3,R)
a + 34R−
1
4
, P
(3,R)
a − 34R +
1
4
), R odd,
with P
(3,R)
a = 32
∑R
i=1 i = 3R(R + 1)/4.
For games with four columns, the optimal play and the payoffs for boards up to six
rows are shown in figure 4.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium play and payoffs of the games M(3, R) for R = 1, . . . , 7. The green
monominoes correspond to player 1, the orange ones to player 2.
Figure 4: Equilibrium play and payoffs of the games M(4, R) for R = 1, . . . , 6. The green
monominoes correspond to player 1, the orange ones to player 2.
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Figure 5: Equilibrium play and payoffs of the games M(5, R) for R = 1, . . . , 5. The green
monominoes correspond to player 1, the orange ones to player 2.
Conjecture 8. In the game M(4, R) the equilibrium play is as follows. If R is even and
player 1 played Vi, then player 2 also plays Vi. If R is odd, then the first two moves are
V1, and V2. Thereafter, if player 1 plays V3 on the first row, then player 2 plays V4 on the
same row. Otherwise, if player 1 plays Vi, then player 2 does the same. The equilibrium
payoffs are
(P1, P2) =

(P
(4,R)
a −R,P
(4,R)
a +R), R even,
(P
(4,R)
a −R + 1, P
(4,R)
a +R− 1), R odd,
with P
(4,R)
a = 2
∑R
i=1 i = R(R + 1).
For games with five columns, the optimal play and the payoffs for boards up to five
rows are shown in figure 5.
The results above imply the following general result for monomino games M(C,R).
Conjecture 9. In the game M(C,R) equilibrium play is as follows. If R is even and
player 1 played Vi, then player 2 also plays Vi.
If R is odd and C is odd, then player 1 starts with V1. If player 2 plays Vj on the first
row, then player 1 plays Vj+1 on the same row. Else, if player 2 plays Vi, then player 1
does the same.
Finally, if R is odd and C is even, then the first two moves are V1, and V2. If player 1
plays Vj on the first row, then player 2 plays Vj+1 on the same row. Else, if player 1 plays
Vi, then player 2 does the same. The equilibrium payoffs are
(P1, P2) =


(P
(C,R)
a − C4R,P
(C,R)
a + C4R), R even,
(P
(C,R)
a −
C(R−1)
4
, P
(C,R)
a +
C(R−1)
4
), R odd, C even,
(P
(C,R)
a +
C(R−1)
4
+ 1
2
, P
(C,R)
a −
C(R−1)
4
− 1
2
), R odd, C odd,
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with P
(C,R)
a = C2
∑R
i=1 i = CR(R + 1)/4.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we introduced a new class of non-cooperative games: the monomino games
M(C,R). These are constant sum games with Nash equilibria in pure strategies. For
games with one and two columns, we derived the equilibrium play and the payoffs. For
games with more than two columns, we conjecture general results.
For future research, we intend to study non-cooperative ‘domino’ games. These games
are played on a board of size R×C where players one by one put pieces of size 1×C on the
board, either in horizontal or vertical direction. (For C = 2 the pieces are the well-known
domino pieces.) Some initial analysis on these games is done in [3]. There it turned out
that these games are much more complex than monomino games. One of the reasons is
that in these games some cells of the board may remain uncovered.
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